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Abstract 
With the advancement of Internet technology, securing information systems from 
electronic attacks have become a significant concern. With all the preventive methods, 
malicious users still find new methods that overcome the system security, and access 
and modify sensitive information. To make the process of damage assessment and 
recovery fast and effective and in order not to scan the whole log, researchers have 
proposed different methods for segmenting the log, and accordingly presented different 
damage assessment and recovery algorithms. In this work we present an efficient 
damage assessment and recovery algorithm to recover from malicious transactions based 
on the concept of the matrix. We also compare the various approaches and present the 
performance results. 
Keywords: Damage Assessment, Recovery, Malicious Transaction, Transaction 
Dependency, Data Dependency. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Prevention, detection and recovery are three important phases in any “live” 
system. The prevention phase consists of the following: authentication, authorization, 
access control, firewalls, and data encryption. Still, malicious users and hackers‟ manage 
to overcome these security measures and attack the system.  
In case preventive methods fail, we use the intrusion detection systems, which are 
used for monitoring malicious transactions. When intrusion detection systems were built 
they were meant to work in harmony with the preventive methods. Mainly, detection 
methods can be split into two categories: anomaly detection (statistical) and misuse 
detection (Ning and Jajodia, 2004). Anomaly detection works by analyzing the behavior 
of the user (i.e., whether it is usual or unusual). On the other hand, misuse detection 
works by comparing actions to a set of rules or vulnerabilities that are already saved in 
the system. None of these detection systems ensure that an attack will be immediately 
detected. Hence, damage could spread affecting other new coming “clean” transactions 
as well. 
During the past two decades, internet usage has been increasing rapidly. This 
increase has always been accompanied by information sharing, which is a key element 
for success and productivity of an organization. Millions of computers worldwide are 
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connected to each other and are sharing information. The importance of this process is to 
preserve the reliability of information. Securing information is made on three levels: 
prevention, detection and recovery. Prevention might fail and detection might be late, in 
this case some data might be corrupted. Our aim, after this corruption and after detecting 
that something malicious has occurred, is to remove and clean the corruption with its 
effects. In such a case a recovery algorithm must be used. 
When dealing with electronic data and electronic transactions it is harder to 
identify which user is malicious and which is authenticated. The system treats all the 
users the same and accept their transactions. Some intrusion detection systems, such as 
SQMR (Hua, Xiaolin, Guineng, and Ziyue, 2011), are classifying users according to 
their behavior. Yet, in some cases these methods fail to classify allowing malicious users 
and suspecting and preventing normal users from doing their job. For example in (Hua, 
Xiaolin,  Guineng, and Ziyue, 2011), every user is considered a malicious user and his 
transactions will not take actual action in the database until a certain period of time 
elapses or some action occurs after. After this, we would be able to classify the previous 
behavior or user as either malicious or non-malicious. Accordingly, we can either 
commit the transactions or abort them. For this reason, whenever a malicious transaction 
is identified we need to go back and trace it to be able to remove all of its effects. 
1.2 The Problem 
As soon as an attack is detected by an intrusion detection system, it should be 
directly recovered. Unfortunately, the detection of an attack is not done immediately, 
and this can affect other coming transactions. Hence, all transactions from the point of 
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the attack and onwards should be assessed whether they are affected or not. Two 
approaches exist for assessing the malicious transaction effects: transactional 
dependency (Panda and Zhou, 2003) and data dependency (Panda and  Haque, 2002). 
For example, consider a malicious transaction Ti that committed, and then a transaction 
Tj read a data item written by Ti. The result would be having Tj as an affected 
transaction. Therefore, upon recovery we do not only need to delete Ti, but also to 
recover Tj. 
The complexity and efficiency of the recovery process is our main interest in this 
work. In some cases the adversary‟s intentions are not only to insert malicious 
transactions but also to cause a denial of service. Sometimes the size of the log file 
might increase tremendously before discovering that an attack has occurred. 
Consequently, this will require more time to assess and recover from the malicious 
transaction and its effects. This increase in recovery time would lead to denial of service. 
Thus, we are interested in finding an algorithm that prevents such drawbacks or at least 
one that reduces them. One of the important issues that should also be tackled is what 
information should be saved in the log file as we prevent excess I/O. For this purpose, 
some researchers (Ammann, Jajodia, and Liu , 2002), (Haraty and Zeitunlian, 2007); 
(Chakraborty et al., 2010) and (Panda and Zhou, 2003), have proposed using auxiliary 
structures for keeping track of dependencies while others proposed using matrices. 
1.3 Information Warfare 
Information Warfare the term that is affecting everybody‟s life is one of the hot 
topics nowadays. This term have moved us to a new period of time where the whole 
4 
 
world is changing. Information warfare did not start as a computing term only, but it was 
also referred to on the psychological level as well. In the 1980‟s information warfare 
was a military term that developed and became a way of living in 1991, especially with 
the Gulf war (Hutchinsn, 2006). Information warfare refers to one of the most affective 
weapons that have been and are being used in today‟s wars. Warfare started with the 
Agrarian revolution and then passed by the industrial revolution to reach to what we call 
now the information warfare (Haeni, 1997). 
 “What is Information Warfare?” a question with no exact answer due to the 
different and many dimensions of this term. Libicki and Fellow, (1995) compared 
defining information warfare to discovering the nature of an elephant by a blind person. 
If one touches the tail he will think it is a rope, while if he touches the leg he will think it 
is a tree. That is to say that information warfare is a huge thing and has different 
dimensions. It would be defined according to which dimension the person will tackle. 
In this work we will only consider one of the many aspects of information warfare. 
For our purpose, information warfare is the set of techniques taken to gain access to the 
information of an adversary while defending your own information. Some of the 
weapons that can be used in such a war are: logic bombs, computer viruses, information 
collection, information manipulation, information degradation and denial of service: 
 Logic bombs: These can be Trojan horses that are either present with in a normal 
code or are independent programs. Such a weapon can be used by a country that 
wants to gain access over another country‟s computers by implementing a Trojan 
horse inside software that they are planning to sell it to them. 
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 Computer viruses: These are code fragments that insert themselves into a 
program to modify it. For example, such weapons could be used in phones and 
might cause phone system failure at certain stages. 
 Information collection: The more the information we have about our adversary 
the better. This information will aware us of what are the plans of the other party 
(Megan, 1999). 
 Information manipulation: The change in the information to give a wrong picture 
to the adversary (Megan, 1999). 
 Information degradation and denial: This is used to prevent the adversary from 
getting complete or correct information. This technique is done either by 
disturbance or overloading the system so it becomes busy (Megan, 1999). 
In order to have the upper hand on the information two different aspects should be 
understood: the information-in-warfare and the information based process (Ryan, 1998). 
To be able to defend your data and to be able to exploit the data of others, one should 
have a full understanding of how things work. One should not only know how to attack 
or defend himself, but also how to gain and exploit. If we attack a system and do not 
gain access to it or do not exploit it, then the attack is useless. 
1.4 Scope of the Work 
         In this thesis, we present a recovery model that works with matrices. Our approach 
suggests that we keep a matrix along with the logging process. This matrix saves the 
dependency between transactions and data items. During the recovery process all the 
needed information will retrieved from the matrix. The aim of this work is for fast and 
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efficient recovery. It requires only scanning part of the matrix to be able to discover the 
dependency rather than scanning the entire log file.  
The main contribution in our model is the use of a matrix that requires less time to 
be scanned than when scanning graphs, like the traditional cluster algorithms. In 
addition, the use of bits in our algorithm requires less time to be dealt with than any 
other normal numbers. Moreover, we use only one matrix rather than using two matrices 
for each of the read and write operations; hence this saves time and space as well. 
Dependency of transactions is saved in only one matrix which requires less 
computational time and space. No logical operations and no graphs are used in this 
model. All of this contributes to make our model faster than previously proposed 
algorithm. 
1.5 Definitions 
The following definitions will be used throughout the thesis: 
Definition 1: A write operation wi[x] of a transaction Ti is dependent on a read ri[y] 
operation of Ti, if wi[x] is computed using the value obtained from ri[y] (Panda and 
Tripathy, 2000). 
Definition 2: A blind write is when a transaction Ti writes data item x without reading 
the previous values of x (Zheng, Qin and Sun, 2007). 
Definition 3: A write operation wi[x] of a transaction is dependent on a set of data items 
I, if x = f(I); i.e, the values of data items in I are used in calculating the new value of x. If 
x ≠ I, the operation is called a blind write. In this case if the previous value of x (before 
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this write operation) is damaged and none of the data items in I are damaged, then the 
value of x will be refreshed after this write operation (Panda and Tripathy, 2000). 
Definition 4: If X is totally ordered under ≤, then the following statements hold for all a, 
b and c in X: 
If a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a = b (antisymmetry) 
If a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c (transitivity)  
a ≤ b or b ≤ a (totality) 
Definition 5: If a read(x)/write(x) is to be executed in a strict execution, it will be 
delayed until all write(x) operations are either committed or aborted (Gray and Reuter, 
1993). 
Definition 6: A transaction management mechanism guarantees rigorousness if the 
following two conditions hold (Kim et al., 2010): 
1. it guarantees strictness, and 
2. No data item may be written until the transaction which previously read either 
commits or abort  
1.6 Organization of the Report 
The rest of this report is organized as follows: in chapter 2 we will present related 
work and give an overview about what previous research has lead to in this area. Then a 
new algorithm will be presented in chapter 3. While in chapter 4 we present the 
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experimental results; this will be followed by a conclusion and the future work in 
chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Malicious transaction detection and recovery have taken a lot of effort from 
researchers. Many models were proposed for this purpose, some of which cluster the log 
files while others use sub-clusters, graphs or even matrices. Damage recovery from 
malicious attacks is divided into two main categories, transactional dependency and data 
dependency. In each area, several models have been suggested. In this section we 
provide an overview on these models. 
2.1 Coldstar Model 
Panda and Tripathy (2000), unlike previous traditional approaches, this approach 
is known as a transaction dependency approach. They assume that an attack is partial 
and never complete. The recovery is split into two problems: the damage assessment and 
the damage repair process. The authors suggest the use of „Coldstar‟ semantics in one of 
their algorithms where the database becomes unavailable for new transactions, and they 
also suggest another algorithm using the „Warmstart‟ semantics where the database use 
continues with some services but stops with others. In this approach, only affected and 
malicious transactions are dealt with. There is no need for any change in non-malicious 
or non-affected transactions. Malicious transactions are undone; affected transactions are 
re-done; non-malicious and non-affected transactions are neither undone nor redone. To 
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assess the recovery performance, the average repair time and the average response time 
are taken into consideration. 
Since some transactions are not affected by any malicious or affected transaction, 
they can be ignored and not worked with. For this purpose, Ammann, Jajodia, and Liu 
(2002) suggested, segmenting the log files so the work would only be done on the part of 
the log that is affected. This will ensure accelerating the recovery process. Operations 
are clustered according to their dependency where each cluster contains dependent 
operations. This clustering is done in a periodic way for the active transactions. Every 
operation will be stored in only one cluster, but a transaction can belong to more than 
one cluster. The algorithm presented in this paper accelerates the recovery process since 
not all of the massive log file will be scanned to reach the operations wanted. However, 
deleted transactions cannot be retrieved, so maliciously deleted transaction might be 
skipped. The advantage of this approach is that we can previously determine which 
items are affected, and accordingly we will be skipping a large part of the log.  
2.2 Traditional Methods 
Traditional methods suggest scanning the log file from the point of the attack until 
the end of the file to undo and redo the affected transactions. Panda in his paper (Panda  
and Yalamanchili, 2001)suggested a new method which is fusing the malicious 
transactions to reduce the I/O time. The aim of this model is to minimize the time to get 
the best results without getting any other consequences. The assumptions in this model 
are the following: 
1. Strictly serializable scheduler, 
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2. No blind writes, and 
3. No purging of log files. 
Undoing the affected transactions occurs in the reverse order of how they 
happened, while the redoing of these transactions occur in the same order. 
Compensated-for transactions are transactions that need to be undone, while 
compensating-for transactions are transactions that are redone. For the sake of saving 
time, instead of accessing the logs and searching for the transaction, the fused 
transaction method is used to re-execute the fused transactions. This method has two 
advantages: first, only one commit is needed, which helps in case a data item has been 
read or updated, and the second one is that dependent transactions will be fused. From 
the point of attack and onwards, we start by detecting the malicious transactions and 
their fused dependents, and any transaction that is unaffected will be ignored. 
The recovery procedure for fused transactions requires data structures such as 
M_ID, F_ID, M_flag and F_flag. Fuse a function used to combine operations from two 
transactions into a fused transaction. In this function to confirm that an operation should 
be skipped, a check is done on the data item, otherwise the operation will be added to the 
fused transaction. The schedule is scanned from the attacking point till the end to group 
the malicious transactions using the fuse function followed by generating IDs. The 
method also keeps track of which transaction is the first among the fused transactions. 
2.3 Using Graphs for Recovery 
The spread of the Internet and its applications made the presence of assessment 
and recovery very crucial. Two different approaches exist for damage assessment: 
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transaction dependency and data dependency. Data dependency is more efficient and 
less time consuming than transaction dependency. Panda and Haque (2002) used the 
data dependency approach where operations of transactions are undone and redone. This 
approach has some inefficacy because unexecuted segments are not present in the 
history. The four conditions that must be present to ensure successful recovery are: 
1. Use of a strictly serializable scheduler, 
2. Use of the same order of the transactions in the history and the log,  
3. Use of a rigorous 2PL, and  
4. No modification of the log file by the user.  
Each read/write operation in the transaction has a block number; this number 
shows dependency between operations. Panda suggested the use of a Directed Damage 
Demonstration Graph (DDDG), which only presents the affected data items. Two 
different shapes represent the nodes: either a circle or a square (continuous or dotted 
line). A clean item is represented by a circle, while a corrupted one is represented by a 
square depending on either an actual-write or overlooked-write. Arrows in this graph 
show dependency. Arrows of two forms (single and double line arrows) are used 
depending on whether the read is actual or predicate. Three data structures are created in 
this algorithm: damageDataList, readDataList_T_bNum and totalDataList_T. The 
readDataLists are checked whenever a write operation is present. In this algorithm, the 
detection of a malicious transaction requires a check on all the transactions that are in 
the schedule, followed by a check on all committed transactions. Any committed 
transaction that is detected to be affected will be added to the damageDataList. After 
identifying and creating the three lists, the undo_redo procedure is called upon, which 
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takes the totalDataList and the damageDataList. Panda used the logical operation in 
addition to the before and after images for recovery. 
Panda and Gordano (1998) proposed two data dependency algorithms are 
presented; the difference between them is that in the first the damage assessment and 
recovery algorithms are performed simultaneously whereas in the second each one is 
performed separately. This difference implies different behaviors on the algorithm level 
as well. For example, when both the damage assessment and recovery are done 
simultaneously the system will have to go through denial of service for a longer period 
of time in order to recover completely. This is unlike when the damage assessment is 
done independently, where the results are provided to the recovery algorithm in which 
we have the advantage of shorter periods of time; and hence, less denial of service. In 
the second algorithm, the system will be going through denial of service only during the 
damage assessment, but when the recovery algorithm starts to take action, the unaffected 
transactions will be unlocked for the user, and he will be able to work normally unless 
he wants to access affected data. 
In both approaches the damage assessment works using directed graphs, where the 
nodes would represent a data item. When the intrusion detection system reports the 
occurrence of a malicious transaction, a node for each data item will be created. This 
node will be represented as a square. This graph helps in mapping how the damage has 
spread. 
 
 
14 
 
2.4 Clusters and Sub clusters 
Haraty and Zeitunlian (2007) proposed a model that uses data dependency that 
depends on clustering. Each cluster is sub-clustered using one of the two approaches: 
number of transactions or space occupied. Before going any further with the model, the 
assumptions are as follows: 
 The detection of malicious transactions by external detection techniques, 
 The use of rigorous serializable scheduler, 
 No purging of Log files, and  
 The use sequential transaction ID. 
Two structures of different functionalities are used in the hybrid sub-clustering 
algorithm: Transaction Sub Cluster (TSC) list and the Sub Cluster Data (SCD) List. The 
first one is used to identify the affected sub clusters; it stores the transactions ID. After 
identifying the sub cluster from the first structure, the latter is used to identify the 
affected data items. 
The hybrid sub-Clustering algorithm based on fixed number of transactions limits 
every sub cluster so that it can only contain a specific number of transactions. Data items 
could belong to the predicate, or the operation could belong to the statement. In case of 
the predicate, the data item could either belong to a cluster‟s sub cluster (SCD) or not. If 
it does not belong, then a new cluster and sub cluster ID should be given, followed by an 
update on the TSC and SCD. In case it belongs to the cluster‟s sub cluster (SCD), then a 
check on the number of transaction should be done to either get the cluster and sub 
15 
 
cluster ID or to initiate a new sub cluster since every sub cluster could contain only a 
fixed number of transactions. Otherwise, the data item can either belong or not to the 
cluster‟s sub-cluster. If the data item does not belong to the cluster‟s sub-cluster, then a 
new cluster and sub cluster IDs should be initialized; otherwise, the sub-cluster‟s size 
should be taken into consideration to either initiate a new sub-cluster or to take the 
cluster‟s and sub-cluster‟s IDs. After checking the cluster and sub-cluster, the operation 
should be checked to confim if it is an actual read or an overlook read before it is 
recorded into the log. 
The hybrid clustering algorithm is based on fixed size and has a limited size for 
the sub-cluster. The limitation of this algorithm is the size of the sub-cluster; i.e., all 
dependent operations are put in the same sub-cluster, until a point is reached where 
adding another operation will let the sub-cluster go over the required space, so it is 
inserted in a new sub-cluster.  
The damage assessment algorithm has two structures: Damaged_DI and 
Damaged_PB. A check on whether the predicate is read is performed to assess whether 
it belongs to the Damaged_DI. Consequently, the block in which this item is present is 
damaged as well; hence, the block should be added to the Damaged_PB. Then, a check 
on whether there is an actual or overlooked read is executed: if the data item is damaged 
but operation does not belong to a malicious transaction, the block should be checked. In 
case it is listed as damaged, it should be added to the damaged_PB. In case of a write 
operation, if there is a malicious transaction where the data item is not in the 
damaged_DI, then it should be added; however, if the transaction is not malicious and 
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the block is not affected, the data item is affected then the data item should be removed 
from the damaged_DI list. 
Fu et al. (2008) started by explaining the concept of “Extended Read Operations” 
and moved on to propose the concept of Fine Grained Transaction Log (FGTL). Log 
files should be able to help find the dependencies among operations and transactions to 
be able to recover easily. So, not only the main sub-clause of an SQL-statement should 
be recorded in the log file, but also every sub-clause is of similar importance since these 
sub-clauses can help in spreading the damage. According to the author, the FGTL should 
record all writes in addition to every extended read. All committed transactions should 
be logged. This log is represented as a database table that cannot be modified by any 
user. Some read operations are just a sub query of a main SQL statement so logging 
these read operations requires more effort. To solve this problem the “Divide and 
Combination Algorithm” is suggested to be used to log these read operations. This 
algorithm works by dividing the “Select” statements into several statements to be able to 
log the read information. The result of this algorithm is exactly the same as what the 
original statement would result. In case an Update Insert Delete statement is present, the 
same would be done for the “Select” statement, and then the last step would be updating 
the information. 
After the “Divide and Combination Algorithm”, the Fine Grained Transaction Log 
is proposed. The FGTL saves each write and read operation executed by the user. The 
generated log is used for damage assessment; therefore, it should be protected from any 
unwanted modification. This is done using the DB Monitor, which is responsible for 
capturing and checking each operation. 
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The problem with this technique is that when the association degree of the 
transaction increases, the throughput of the FGTL decreases sharply. As the degree is 
increasing, more reads are required; hence, the throughput is decreasing. This technique 
may cause degradation in services but still it preserves integrity of the log. 
2.5 Before Images 
Xie et al. (2008) suggested a new way for damage assessment and recovery. Xie 
suggested the use of a before image table to keep track of all deleted transactions and to 
help in analyzing potential reads. The before image is a data object created in the 
database. In this approach the inter-transaction dependency is taken into consideration, 
which relates even deleted transactions. Xie classified affected transactions into two 
types: transactions affected by maliciously inserted data and transactions affected by 
maliciously deleting data. The problem with the second type of affected transactions is 
that they usually cannot be tracked through log histories, which can cause many 
inconsistencies, so Xie tried to overcome this problem in his approach. Xie dealt with 
two types of operations: insert and delete. He considered an update operation as two 
operations: delete operation followed by an insert. The database is represented as D(V, 
B) where V represents the set of data items, and B is the set of deleted data items. Any 
two transactions are considered dependent if there is an actual or potential read. 
Before Image (BI) tables are tables that are not accessible by users and have the 
same structure as the original tables, except that they do not have any constraints. To 
avoid the problem of data redundancy,  Xie suggested to use a time widow to delete data 
items and restrict the size of the BI tables. In addition to the BI table, two other 
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structures are maintained the x.ins_tran and x.del_tran that represent the transactions that 
insert or delete a data item. After the execution of a read transaction, the ID of the 
depending transaction is added to the DS. Then, this is stored in a TanDepTab. 
Executing a subquery on a table is accompanied by executing the same subquery on the 
BI table. 
Two steps should be executed to completely repair the database: first identify and 
then erase the effects of malicious transactions. Identifying the affected transactions is 
made easier because of the interdependency graph, which is represented as the 
TranDepTab. The repair algorithm is an on-the-fly algorithm, which saves the problem 
of stopping server responses. Repairing requires deleting inserted data items and 
restoring deleted data items by the transaction. 
This algorithm requires more performance overhead due to the BI table and the 
queries done on them. The results proved that this algorithm can function well with a 
reasonable degradation in performance. 
2.6 Column Dependency 
Chakraborty et al. (2010), presented column-dependency approach. The method is 
decomposed into two phases the compensation phase and the re-execution phase. The 
compensation phase is responsible for compensating the malicious transactions, where 
as the re-execution phase is responsible for re-executing the other committed 
transactions for consistency purposes. Two approaches are applied: one for static 
recover and the other for online recovery. The recovery time of this approach is 
tp=ta+tc+te where: 
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 ta: the damage assessment time 
 tc: compensation time 
 te: re-execution time 
The advantage of this approach is that it takes less time than the traditional 
approach to recover from an attack. This approach has showed that the percentage of 
inconsistencies after re-execution increases with the increase of malicious transactions. 
This is similar to the percentage of inconsistencies after compensation, but still the 
percentage after re-execution is more than that after compensation. As for the on-line 
recovery performance, it is linked to the arrival rate of transactions (i.e., as the arrival 
rate increases the recovery processes gets slower). In general, this approach removes all 
the effects of malicious transactions. 
The use of a Local DAR Manager and a Local Dar Executer on each site was 
suggested by Liu and Yu (2011). The Local DAR Executer starts by identifying all 
affected sub transactions and continues to clean these sub transactions. The algorithm 
requires global coordination between different sites. The algorithm starts by identifying 
the bad transactions and then sending them to the Local DAR Manager. 
According to this algorithm, each site has its own log file. Log files have five 
attributes for each record: 
 Type of the record: read, write, abort, commit, prepare and end 
 Application id 
 Transaction id 
 Coordinator id 
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 Subordinates id 
The throughput on each site is approximately the same as that of centralized 
database systems. The advantages of this approach are that no deadlocks are caused and 
there is no waiting time for this algorithm to start. Transaction dependencies and 
attacking rate are one of the most important factors that affect the communication costs 
in this algorithm. It is an on-the-fly algorithm, which implies transaction processing will 
not be stopped during the repair process. The damage assessment and recovery process 
are done in parallel so less time will be required by the algorithm, and the damage 
assessment and repair are transparent to the user. 
2.7 Matrices in Recovery 
Panda and Zhou (2003) proposed two damage assessment approaches one with 
transaction dependency and the other with data dependency. The aim of these 
approaches is to find a fast and accurate model. In his model, Panda uses two bit-
matrices. The assumptions that Panda made for his model are: 
1. Rigorous history, 
2. Logs cannot be changed by users, and 
3. Transaction dependency are not changed during recovery. 
Four data structures are used in his model: Read_Matrix, Write_Matrix, 
Damaged_Data_Vector and Damaged_Transaction_List. Transactions are ordered in the 
matrix in the same sequence as in the log. Directed acyclic graph is maintained to track 
the dependencies. In each of the Read_Matrix and Write_Matix, the rows are for 
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transactions and the columns are for items. Zero means that this data item is not in this 
transaction, otherwise we have a one. 
Once a malicious transaction is detected it will be added to the 
Damaged_Transaction_List. The Damaged_Data_Vector should be OR-ed with the 
Write_Matrix. Any resulting 1 indicates that the data item is affected by the malicious 
transaction. As for the read, the Read_matrix is OR-ed with Damaged_Data_Vector. If 
there is any „1‟ in the vector, then the read operation was affected by the malicious 
transaction. Affected transactions should be refreshed; the process should be repeated 
until no more ones. With these steps all the affected transactions are located. So this 
should be followed by a recovery model. 
Using Panda‟s algorithm for damage assessment the database logs will not be 
accessed, which will help in reducing the time and reducing the risk of denial-of-service. 
Two other structures the Compact_Read_list and the Compact_Write_List are used in 
this algorithm. This list contains sublists of the data items that have been read/written by 
this transaction, where the transaction ID is saved. 
As for the data dependency model, it is unlike the transaction dependency model 
where the reading of one affected data item makes all written data items by that 
transaction affected. In this model, we have two structures - the 
Data_Dependency_Write_Matrix and the Data_Dependency_Read_Matrix. The first 
column of these matrices contains the transaction ID and the second one contains the 
operation number. By scanning the log file, these two structures will be constructed. 
After detecting the first malicious transaction, it will be added to the 
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Damages_Transaction_List and then it will be followed by OR-ing with the transactions 
to see what the affected transactions are. 
Ragothaman and Panda (2002) has suggested segmenting log files into clusters, 
but still this will not solve the problem. We cannot control the size of the dependent 
transactions and hence the clusters may grow in size. To solve this problem, Haraty and 
Zeitunlian (2007) proposed the use of clusters and sub clusters. Data inside a cluster are 
records that have some data dependency, where as data in the same sub cluster could be 
for one of the following two reasons: number of data items or space occupied. This 
approach groups data according to exact dependency and it helps to recover faster. 
Instead of scanning the whole log, and even instead of scanning the whole cluster we 
will only be scanning a small sub cluster to recover. Two additional lists are used in this 
algorithm the Transaction Sub Cluster List and the Sub Cluster Data List. The first is 
used to store the Transaction ID along with the corresponding Sub Cluster, where as the 
latter is used to store the sub cluster ID along with the transaction ID and the data item. 
Zhou et al. (2004) proposed a similar model for distributed databases. The model 
proposed works on transaction dependency in order to recover from malicious attacks. 
This work extends the work of Zhou and Panda (2005) and requires additional structures 
to recover when working on distributed databases. The model in this paper requires the 
use of pre-developed structures, read, and write matrices. Transactions are represented 
as rows in these matrices and they are updated whenever a transaction is committed. The 
advantage of this method is that it does not require the use of the log file which will 
decrease the access time. The author also assumes that there is a timestamp for each 
23 
 
transaction. This timestamp will be compared against timestamps of different 
transactions from different sites and hence recovery would be followed. 
Lala and Panda (2001) also presented a work that depends on matrices in which he 
also suggested another algorithm. The new algorithm suggested by Panda was for the 
damage assessment. In this algorithm, Panda suggested to cluster the transactions so he 
does not have to search transactions that have no effect. In this model, an additional 
column was added to each of the matrices that Panda proposed. The additional column 
will contain that cluster ID to which this transaction belongs. In addition to this, two 
other lists will be used: Dependent_Cluster_List (DCL) and Ancestor_Cluster_List 
(ACL). The dependency between the clusters will be saved in these two lists. If a 
transaction belongs to more than one cluster, then that set of clusters will be merged 
together. The merging of these clusters might lead to a worst case scenario that is having 
the whole transactions in one log. The main goal of the use of clusters was to reduce the 
time of damage assessment and recovery and to be able to perform them in parallel, but 
in the worst case scenario this might be unreachable. To overcome this Panda proposed 
that he will restrict the number of transactions per cluster. 
2.8 Analysis 
Ray et al. (2004) performed analysis on existing algorithms along with a 
suggestion of new techniques was proposed. The complexity analysis was done to check 
the complexity of Ammann, Jajodia, and Liu (2002) as well as the algorithm suggested 
in (Lala and Panda, 2001). The aim of this paper was reducing the damage assessment 
latency so damage spreading will not occur. The disadvantage found in Amman‟s 
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algorithm was that the log file of this algorithm is huge and therefore it will take time 
scanning the part of the log after the malicious transaction. As for Lala and Panda‟s 
algorithm, it showed a worst-case running time of O (vlogv +s), such that v represents 
the number of affected transactions and s represents the sum of sizes of the transaction 
records. The model that this paper suggested uses dependency graph, which will be 
represented by a list structure and then continues by eliminating the queues and using 
depth-first search. The repair schedule produced by this algorithm will be proportional to 
the sum of lengths of affected transactions. 
2.9 Fuzzy dependency 
Zuo and Panda (2004) started by explaining the fuzzy dependency between 
transactions. “For two sets of attributes X and Y of a relation R, Y is fuzzily dependent on 
X if and only if for every value ai in the domain of X, ai belongs to D(X), there is an 
uniquely determined subset Si‟ in the domain of Y, Si‟ subset in D(Y), such that a tuple Ti 
in a relation instance of R with value ai for X should have a value bi belong Si‟ for Y”. 
The authors proposed that there are three uses of the fuzzy dependency: 
1- Used to specify constraints, 
2- Used in intrusion detection, and 
3- Used to reduce the denial of service. 
The suggested recovery algorithm consists mainly of the “Fuzzy Value 
Generator” that interacts with the database and the “Fuzzy dependency storage”.  The 
advantage provided by this algorithm is that the log file will not be traversed as a whole 
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bulk, but rather this model uses the fuzzy relations that are saved. Still the disadvantage 
of this method is the lack of accuracy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODEL 
3.1 Overview  
In this chapter, we present a new detection and recovery model that is guaranteed 
to give reliable and trusted results. The model presented in this work will be triggered 
once it receives a malicious or a set of malicious transactions. Then, it will run to assess 
and find all the good but affected transactions. Finally, the model will end by deleting 
the malicious transactions and recovering from the affected ones. 
3.2 Assumptions 
In our algorithm, we assume that an external intrusion detection system will 
provide our model with the malicious transaction or the set of malicious transactions. 
From that point on, it will be the responsibility of our model to find and clean every 
affected transaction. 
Serial execution occurs when for every i < j, every operation in Ti occurs before 
the operations of Tj. Serial execution ensure a serializable history. In such a history, 
every transaction is assumed to be correct as it would be depending on the committed 
transactions only. Hence, serializability provides correctness (Gray and Reuter, 1993). 
An update to any transaction in the system will be represented in our model as if it is a 
new insert transaction (i.e. a new row in the matrix will be added). For our model, we 
27 
 
assume we have a rigorous serializable history. A sequential log file is also maintained 
in which only committed transactions are saved. This log file cannot be accessed by the 
users at all times and it will be used during recovery. Our algorithm requires the use of 
check points. After a certain period of time, data would become obsolete and then we 
can assume that no malicious transaction exists in that set of transactions. Hence, instead 
of making the log file grow in size tremendously with clean data, we will use check 
points. Check points will diminish the size of the log file and consequently reduce the 
space and the reading time. Check points should be chosen carefully so that they will not 
be too long to cause the log file to grow tremendously and require a lot of time for 
recovering, but yet long enough so that we will not have to go to previous check points 
in case a malicious transaction was detected. But if we faced a case were the intrusion 
detection system was too late to detect the malicious transaction in which a check point 
was already established, we will take advantages of the sequential log file. Using the log 
file we would be able to rebuild the matrix and execute our model as would be done if 
the check point did not exist. 
Another significant characteristic of our model is the use of the dependency 
matrix. The dependency matrix will be treated as the log file, i.e. it will be flushed at 
every check point because we would have guaranteed that the data became obsolete and 
clean. Hence, the matrix and the log file will use the same check point. If we take the 
worst case scenario and consider that a malicious transaction has occurred before the 
check point that we have created, then we will use the log file to rebuild the matrix after 
which the process will continue as any malicious transaction detection. The dependency 
matrix that we have will be a sequential matrix, such that for every i < j, Ti < Tj and Ti 
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can never depend on Tj. The matrix will only save the committed transactions. The 
importance of this matrix is in the detection process. It will be used to discover the 
dependency among transactions and hence see which ones where affected and which 
ones were clean. Panda and Zhou (2003) used dependency matrices as well. But in their 
model they had two different matrices one for the write operations and another for the 
read operations. In addition, they used logical operations between the matrices to 
discover dependencies. However, in our model only one matrix will be used and it will 
show the dependency without any logical operations. 
The attacker may have many intentions; one of these intentions is to cause denial 
of service whether it is direct or indirect, denial of service can be reached directly by 
sending many malicious transactions at the same time, whereas the indirect method 
occurs when the effect takes place at a later stage such as during the detection and 
recovery time. In detection, as the log file increases in size the time required for 
recovery would increase as well. In During detection and recovery time, the system will 
be down and the users will not be able to access it. Hence, this could be one indirect way 
of causing denial of service. So the attacker might be aware that injecting only one 
malicious transaction can require a lot of effort and shut the system for a long period of 
time and may lead to severe damage.  
3.3 The Matrix 
We have discussed the usage of the log file and the matrix so far; in this section 
we will discuss the structure of this matrix. We assume that this matrix is built 
dynamically along with the execution of every transaction. Only committed transactions 
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are inserted into our matrix. The matrix will be a two-dimensional array, such that the 
columns represent all the data items present in our database and the rows represent all 
the transactions that occurred. Each data item will either be blindly written by the 
transaction, left unmodified by the transaction, modified according to one previously 
committed transaction, or modified according to a set of previously committed 
transaction. Each case will be uniquely represented in our matrix. For every transaction, 
each data item will have a value depending on the operations that the transaction has 
gone through, this is represented as follows: 
 00: if the data item is unmodified by that transaction 
 01: if the data item is blindly written by that transaction, data from previous 
transactions is not needed. 
 A positive transaction Id: if dataitem1 of transaction x with transaction Id Tx is 
identified in the matrix with entry Ty such that y < x, this would mean that for 
dataitem1 in Tx we have modified its value according to dataitem1 that was last 
modified by transaction Ty. 
 A negative transaction Id: this means that this data item has been modified 
according to previous data items from different transactions; this will be shown 
in more details in the following section. 
Consider a transaction Tx such that to modify dataitem1 of this transaction we need 
to read dataitem4 of transaction Ty, dataitem3 of transaction Tw, and dataitem1 for from 
transaction Tv, where y, w and v < x. In such a case, the entry in the matrix for that data 
item will be -Tx. Still, –Tx alone will not help us in the recovery process as it does not 
show which transactions have affected it. To solve this problem, we added an additional 
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three-dimensional array that will only be manipulated in such cases. That is, in our 
example the entry of the main matrix for dataitem1 in transaction Tx will have -Tx. Then, 
in the second array the index will be the transaction Id that has been affected by other 
transactions, Tx. The index Tx will be pointing at Ty, Tw and Tv, similar to what is 
presented in tables 1 and 2. 
Table 3. 1 Dependency Matrix    Table 3. 2 Second Complementary Array 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Detection Algorithm 
Our proposed detection algorithm will use an additional data structure. This data 
structure is a one-dimensional array that will save all the affected transactions that our 
algorithm will detect. It works with the two matrices that are being built as the 
transactions are being executed and the set of malicious transactions that will be 
provided by an external intrusion detection system. The set of malicious transactions 
provided from the external intrusion detection system might contain many transactions 
that are not ordered. Since our log file is sequential and due to the characteristics of our 
algorithm, the minimum transaction Id between the set of malicious transactions is 
required to start working from that point. Since we are sure that we will never find a 
 1 2 3 …. 30 
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Tw 00 01 -Tv  00 
….      
Ty Tk -Tr 00  -Td 
Tx -Tx 00 00  00 
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Tv Tw Ty Tv 
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transaction Tj such that j< i and Tj depends on Ti. To reduce the access time and 
consequently reduce the detection time we will traverse the matrix starting from the 
malicious transaction with the least transaction Id and hence skip any transaction that we 
know it will not be affected.  
The matrix will be traversed row by row starting from the transaction that directly 
follows the malicious transaction with the least transaction Id. Then, for each data item 
in that transaction a check will be done to see how the data have been reached. If the 
entry is a „00‟ or „01‟, then our algorithm will skip that column and check the following 
columns. If the entry contains a positive transaction id, a check will be done to see if this 
Id is the same as one of those ids in the malicious set. If it belongs to the malicious set, 
then the transaction Id will be added to the affected transactions structure and we will 
directly move to the transaction after it without looking at the rest of its columns. If one 
of the data items of a certain transaction is affected it would be enough for us to classify 
that transaction as affected transaction and try to update it again during the recovery 
algorithm. If that transaction Id does not belong to the malicious set, this shows that that 
transaction have not been directly affected by the malicious transaction. Still, this is not 
enough to classify the transaction as a clean transaction. It might be affected indirectly 
and thus the effect would be an affected transaction. For this reason, we should also 
search among the affected transactions and see if this transaction belongs to the affected 
transaction, then it should also be updated.  
After presenting what happens in the three above listed cases now we are still left 
with the fourth case which is having a negative transaction Id. A negative transaction Id 
shows that the transaction we are currently looking at has been affected by at least one 
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previously committed transaction. After detecting a negative transaction Id, we will go 
to the second array and retrieve content of the entry that has the same key as the row that 
we were searching. The retrieved content will then be tested to check if any of this 
content has the same Id as any of the transaction Ids that we already have in the 
malicious transaction set. Once we detect that any of these Ids are similar to a malicious 
Id, we will then add that transaction to the affected set and move to the following row. If 
nothing matched, we will apply the test against the affected transactions. Similarly, if the 
transaction was found to depend on an affected transaction; this means the data is dirty 
and should be added to the affected transactions set. For example, if the set of malicious 
transactions is { Tr, Ts, Tt} and the detection algorithm is running and it reached 
transaction Tx, such that data item a for this transaction has the value -Tx, then we will 
refer to the second matrix M2 and try to retrieve the content of M2[Tx]. If M2[Tx]={ Tu, 
Tr, Tz}, the algorithm reaches Tr and inserts Tx into the set of affected transactions. In the 
other case, if the set of malicious transactions are { T v, Ts} and the set of affected 
transactions are { Tt, Tu}, while M2[Tx]={ Tu, Tr, Tz}, the algorithm starts searching to 
check if the transaction Tx is affected or not. It will start by checking the malicious 
transactions against the transactions in M2[Tx]. In this example, it will not be found. 
Hence, the algorithm will move on and check the affected transactions. Tu would be 
matched with the set of transactions in M2[Tx] and the set of affected transactions. 
Consequently, the set of affected transactions would become { Tt, Tu,Tx}. 
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The above algorithm represents the logic of the detection algorithm presented for 
our model. Step 1 represents the information that the algorithm needs in order to 
function, i.e. the set of malicious transactions that an external Intrusion Detection 
System has provided. This information is the trigger for our algorithm; it will enable us 
of evaluating all the other data that we have.  Step 2 is implemented for evaluating the 
ID, from which we will start our algorithm, in order to start assessing the damage that 
the set of malicious transactions have caused. At the same time, the algorithm is trying 
1. Receive the set of malicious transactions 
2. Select the minimum transaction ID among the malicious transactions 
3. Receive the set of malicious transactions 
4. Select the minimum transaction ID among the malicious transactions 
5. For every transaction in the matrix starting from the minimum malicious ID to the end of 
the matrix 
5.1. For each data item 
5.1.1. If (entry == 00) then 
5.1.1.1. Move to the next row 
5.1.2. Else if (entry == 01) then 
5.1.2.1. Move to the next row 
5.1.3. Else if (entry>0 && entry belong Malicious transactions) 
5.1.3.1. Add the Current transaction to the set of affected transactions 
5.1.3.2. Move to the next row 
5.1.4. Else if (entry>0 && entry does not belong Malicious transactions) 
5.1.4.1. For every transaction in the affected transactions set 
5.1.4.1.1. If (entry==Taffected) 
5.1.4.1.1.1. Add entry to affected transactions set 
5.1.4.1.1.2. Move to the next row 
5.1.4.1.2. Else if (entry<0) 
5.1.4.1.2.1. Search secondArray for key==entry 
5.1.4.1.2.2. For each element in secondArray[entry] 
5.1.4.1.2.2.1. If(element belong Malicious transactions) 
5.1.4.1.2.2.1.1. Add the current transaction to the set of 
affected transactions 
5.1.4.1.2.2.1.2. Move to the next row 
5.1.4.1.2.2.2. Else if(element belong to the set of affected 
transactions) 
5.1.4.1.2.2.2.1. Add the current transaction to the set of 
affected transactions 
5.1.4.1.2.2.2.2. Move to the next row 
 
 
Table 3.3 Detection Algorithm Based on Matrices 
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to minimize the effort that the algorithm needs, but through maximizing the effect. Due 
to the fact that our matrix and log file are sequential, we select the minimum transaction 
ID to start the assessment from that point. By selecting the minimum transaction ID, we 
guarantee to cover all the malicious transactions by moving sequentially among them. In 
addition, the fact that the matrices are sequential makes us certain that we will never find 
a transaction before this transaction that depends on it. From step 3 onwards, the actual 
detection of the affected transaction begins. Step 3.1.1 checks if the data item of that 
transaction has been modified, while step 3.1.2 checks if the data item is a blind write. 
Steps 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 checks whether the value in the matrix is positive or negative. 
Accordingly, steps 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.4.1 checks if it belongs to the malicious or 
affected transactions. If the value is negative, then the second array should be search 
which is represented in step 3.1.4.1.2.1.  Similarly, this matrix should be compared with 
the malicious and affected set in order to evaluate if the transaction is clean or not. 
3.5 Example on the Detection Process 
For example, consider a database for a company that contains information about 
the following: 
 Employees: a unique identification number for each employee (EID), first name 
(FName), last name (LName), date of birth (EDOB), job (EJ) and salary 
(ESalary). 
 Customers: a unique identification number for each customer (CID), customer or 
company name (CName) and the customer address (Caddress). 
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 Categories:  a unique identification number for each category (CatID) and 
category name (CatName). 
 Products: a unique identification number for each product (PID), product name 
(PName), price (PP) and category which classifies each product in a category 
(CatID). 
 Order: a unique identification number for each order (OID), the customer to 
whom this order belongs (CID), employee that took this order (EID), the product 
that the customer bought (PID), the quantity (QO), total (TO) and date (date). 
Consider the following transactions in the database stated above: 
T1 = Employee („1‟, „Kim‟, „Stewart‟, „1980-11-02‟,‟Sales‟, „$2000‟); 
T2 = Categories („1‟, „Beverages‟); 
T3 = Products („1‟, „Pepsi‟, „$1‟, „1‟); 
T4 = Categories („2‟, „Dairy Products);  
T5 = Products („2‟, „Cheese, „$4‟, „2‟); 
T6 = Employee („2‟, „John‟, „Adam‟, „1987-21-03‟, „Sales‟, „$1500‟); 
T7 = Customer („1‟, „X‟, „Beirut‟); 
T8 = Customer („2‟, „Y‟, „Beirut‟); 
T9 = Order („1‟, „1‟, „1‟, „1‟, „300‟, „$300‟, „2012-12-01‟); 
T10 = Order („2‟, „2‟, „1‟, „1‟, „250‟, „$250‟, „2012-27-02‟); 
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T11 = Order („3‟, „1‟, „2‟, „2‟, „50‟, „$200‟, „2012-12-04‟); 
T12 = Order („4‟, „1‟, „2‟, „1‟, „150‟, „$150‟, „2012-12-04‟); 
T13 = Order („5‟, „2‟, „2‟, „1‟, „300‟, „$300‟, „2012-01-05‟); 
T14 = Order („6‟, „2‟, „2‟, „1‟, „70‟, „$70‟, „2012-12-05‟); 
Let the dependency matrix that corresponds to this database be called M. This 
matrix will be made up of 21 columns (i.e. EID, FName, LName, EDOB, EJ, ESalary, 
CID, CName, CAddress, CatID, CatName, PID, PName, PP, CatID, OID, CID, EID, 
PID, QO, TO and date). As transaction T1 is committed, a new entry in M will be created 
with the following attributes M[1][ ] = {01, 01, 01, 01, 01, 01, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 
00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00}. The first six columns will be manipulated by „01‟ 
because they will be blindly written by transaction T1. There is no need to look at any 
previously committed transaction to be able to write the values for T1. As for the rest of 
the columns, they will be manipulated by „00‟ because transaction T1 wrote into the 
columns that belong to the Employee table where as the other data items are left 
unmodified. Similarly, after the commitment of transaction T2 a new row will be added 
to the matrix after T1. This is to preserve the property that transactions are sequential in 
the matrix and that there is no i < j such that Tj < Ti. Transaction T2 will write in the 
categories table thus adding values to CatID and CatName. The row belonging to 
transaction T2 will look like: M[2][] = { 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 01, 01, 00, 
00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, „00‟}. Transaction T2 does not need to read values 
from previous transactions be able to write its values. Unlike transaction T3 which 
depends on preciously committed transactions. Each product belongs to a category and 
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in this case product one belongs to the category that was previously committed in 
transaction T2. T3 writes the first three attributes without looking at anything that was 
written before, but the fourth attribute needs to look at the previous transaction. M[3][] 
= { 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00,01,01,01, -T3, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00}. 
Similarly, transactions T4, T5, T6, T7 and T8 will write their values. Transaction T9 is one 
of the transactions that depend on other transactions to write its values. For example, 
transaction T9 is depends on transactions T1, T3 and T7. If any of T1, T3 or T7 is malicious 
then T9 is affected. The row corresponding to -T9 is represented as follows: M[9][] = 
{00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 01,-T9, -T9, -T9, 01, -T9, 01}. Three 
data items are independent and blindly written by transaction T9 which are OID, QO and 
date. These three data items did not need information from previous transactions unlike 
CID, EID, PID, and TO. To save the information related to these four data items an 
additional complementary array, denoted by Comp, is needed. In case of T9, Comp[T9] 
will save every transaction that T9 depends on. Hence, Comp[T9] = { T7, T1, T3}. The 
building of Comp[T9] was executed as follows: to manipulate M[9][16] we needed the 
complementary structure to save the transaction that helped in getting the value of this 
field. Since T9 was for customer „X‟ then this shows that there is dependency between 
transactions T9 and T7. Due to this dependency, T7 was added to the complementary 
array. In case the intrusion detection system detects later on that T7 is malicious then we 
can figure out that T9 was affected. M[9][17] refers to the employee that was responsible 
of this order. Consequently, if this employee was maliciously entered, then transaction 
T9 is affected and we need to recover it. Thus, we need to save this dependency which 
will be reflected in Comp[T9]. Up to this stage Comp[T9] = { T7, T1}. As for M[9][18] it 
refers to the product that was order by customer „X‟ in this transaction. If the product in 
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T3 was malicious, then T9 is affected. Hence, this dependency is essential to be saved 
which will lead to Comp[T9] = { T7, T1, T3}. To calculate the total cost of this transaction 
we need information about the cost of the product that is present in transaction T3 and 
the quantity that the customer will buy which is in transaction T9 itself. Thus, transaction 
T9 depends on transaction T3 which is already reflected in the complementary matrix, so 
no need to add T3 again. The quantity and date of the order are the characteristics of 
transaction T9 and they do not need any previous information to be able to write the 
values. Hence, M[9][19] and M[9][21] are manipulated by „01‟. The commitment of 
transaction T9 and the manipulation of its corresponding row in the matrix can never 
happen before the commitment of transactions T7, T1 and T3. Moreover, the row 
corresponding to transaction T9 can never be created before the creation of each of the 
rows corresponding to each of T7, T1 and T3. The same procedure should be followed for 
each of the transactions after T9. 
The corresponding matrix and complementary array are represented in the tables 
below: 
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Table 3.5 Complementary matrix for the presented example 
T3 T5 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 
 
T2 
   
  
It might be thought that rather than using the additional array we can write in the 
matrix itself the ID of the transaction that the column depends on, but this doesn‟t work 
all of the times. To present the effectiveness of the complementary, consider the same 
database as the one presented above but with a slight addition. A new table, sales, will 
be added. The purpose of this table is to save the total amount of the sales for each 
month. The sales table will have the following structure: salesID, month and the 
totalsales. To calculate the total sales we need to look at the orders table and find all 
every order that have a date within a certain boundary. For example, if we need to find 
the sales for April then we need to find every order that has a date < „2012-01-06‟ and 
date > „2012-30-04‟. The result of this query will be transaction T13 and T14. Thus, the 
total that will be inserted into the sales table is $370. While building the matrix, when 
we reach the totalsales column for this transaction we cannot refer to these two 
depending on transactions in one column. Hence, for this reason we decided to use the 
complementary array that will be dynamic and we will be able to add to it as much 
T4 
-T7 -T1 -T3 -T8 -T1 -T3 
-T7 -T6 -T3 
-T8 -T6 -T3 
-T7 -T6 -T5 -T8 -T6 -T3 
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depending on transactions as we want. In this case, complementary array will look like 
the table 3.6: 
Table 3.6 Complementary matrix for example 2 
T3 --- T14 --- Tx 
   
T2 
 
Consider the case were the intrusion detection system will provide our model with 
the ID T2. Our detection algorithm will start by retrieving the malicious transaction with 
the least transaction ID, but in this case we have only one transaction. Hence, the 
algorithm will start searching the matrix starting from T3 rather than starting from T1 like 
other models. This shows that when working on a larger scale we might be skipping 
100‟s of rows. Consequently, this will reduce the assessment time. We will also skip the 
row corresponding to transaction T2 since we already know that this transaction is 
malicious. Our algorithm will use two structures: malicious_trans and affected_trans. 
The malicious_trans will start by having transaction T2 (i.e. the malicious transaction 
that the intrusion detection system provided). 
The damage assessment algorithm will start by traversing row T3. Whenever the 
algorithm sees a „00‟ it stop the search in the column and starts with the second column. 
„00‟ means that this column or data item have not been modified in this transaction. 
Similarly, if our algorithm sees a „01‟, it will skip to the next column as this would mean 
that this data item has been blindly written (i.e. without having the need to check values 
-T8 -T6 -T3 
-T13 -T14 
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from previously committed transactions). When our algorithm reaches M[T3][CatID] it 
will be faced with a new case. M[T3][CatID] contains a negative value. Thus, our 
algorithm will have to refer to the complementary array to check on which transactions 
does this transaction depended to write its values. Comp[T3] points to T2, T2 will be 
checked against the set of malicious transactions (malicious_trans). Since T2 is 
malicious, T3 will be added to the affected_trans. Since, T2 is added to the set of affected 
transactions then there is no need to continue assessing the other columns of this row. 
The algorithm will skip the other columns and start assessing T4. While assessing T4, the 
algorithm will not find any case other than „00‟ and „01‟. Thus, there will be no need for 
comparing against the malicious_trans and affected_trans. At the row related to 
transaction T5, all the columns before the CatID will be skipped as they are either „00‟ or 
„01‟. For M[T5][CatID], the algorithm will have to consider the case of a negative 
transaction ID. Thus, the algorithm will get the set of transactions that T5 depends on 
from the complementary array. There is only one transaction that T5 depends on which is 
T5. T5 will be compared against the malicious_trans that contains only T2 in this case. 
Since no similarities exist between the Comp[T5] and malicious_trans that means there 
is no direct effect on the malicious transaction. Hence, no we need to check if T5 is 
indirectly affected by T2. The check of indirect effect is done by checking the set in 
affected_trans. Again there is no similarities between the affected_trans and Comp[T5]. 
Hence, the algorithm should continue by checking every column of T5. The same 
process will be followed for each row until we reach the row corresponding to 
transaction T14. The result of this algorithm will be as follows: malicious_trans = {T2} 
and affected_trans = {T3, T9, T10, T12, T13, T14}. At this step the damage assessment 
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algorithm will be done. These results will be sent to the recovery algorithm that will do 
the actual recovery. 
3.6 Recovery Model 
          The recovery algorithm requires one additional structure that will be responsible 
for reading the log file.  After the detection algorithm is done, it will trigger the recovery 
algorithm by sending to it the set of malicious transactions and the set of affected 
transactions. The malicious transactions will be deleted, while the affected transactions 
would be recovered to act as if no malicious transactions have occurred. The algorithm 
will run until we reach a stable state in the database. A state were all of the data is 
consistent (i.e. no malicious transaction exits and any affected transaction is recovered). 
In our case, a stable database refers to a database that has recovered every malicious and 
affected transaction where its data is the same as if no malicious transaction has 
occurred. In this algorithm, the log file will be read and put into an array so we can 
index any record we want. We refer to it as if we are indexing an array rather than 
reading all the records in the log file until we reach the value or record that we want. 
This way will decrease the access time that will be needed to read the log file whenever 
we want to delete or recover a dirty transaction. The sets of malicious and affected 
transactions will be traversed and for each transaction we will go back and check what 
information the log file has about it in order to do the proper update. The algorithm is 
illustrated in table 4.1. 
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Steps 1 and 2 show how the algorithm is preparing the environment to start the recovery 
process. Step 3 and its sub-steps 3.1 and 3.2 represent the recovery process for the 
affected transactions. We start by the affected transaction to be able to trace back and 
update the values of the transactions accordingly as if no malicious transaction have 
occurred and modified our data. For example, if transaction Tx was affected by the 
malicious transaction Ty,where y < x, after Tx reading dataitem2 from Ty, we would go 
back and check how Ty got dataitem2.  Then, modify the record of transaction Tx. After 
this, we will be able to update any transaction that depends on transaction Tx by reading 
its new values. After modifying the data of all of the affected transactions now, as shown 
in step 4, we will retrieve the malicious transactions with their information and delete 
these unwanted data. 
3.7 Example on the Recovery Process 
         In this section, we will explain the recovery algorithm based on the example 
presented in section 3.5. After working with the damage assessment in section 3.5, we 
were able to detect all the affected transactions that depends on the malicious transaction 
T2. The set of malicious transactions is {T2} while the set of affected transactions is {T3, 
T9, T10, T12, T13, T14}. 
1. Receive the sets of malicious and affected transactions 
2. Read the file into an array 
3. For each transaction in the affected transaction set  
3.1. Retrieve the log file information for that transaction 
3.2. Update the transaction accordingly 
4. For each transaction in the malicious transaction set 
4.1. Retrieve the log file information for that transaction 
4.2. Delete the transaction 
Table 3.7 Recover algorithm 
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The recovery algorithm will start by recovering from the affected transactions. T3 
is the first affected transactions. Since T2 has maliciously entered a new category into the 
database that was not meant to be inserted, any product that belongs to that category 
should be deleted. These products cannot be classified under any other category. Hence, 
the only way to recover this is by deleting this transaction. If the product does not exist, 
then similarly the orders cannot exist. Thus, each of T9, T10, T12, T13 and T14 should also 
be deleted. After recovering all of the affected transactions, we now need to delete the 
malicious transaction T2. Any malicious transaction cannot be recovered it should only 
be deleted. Unlike affected transactions that can be recovered depending on each 
situation solely. After the recovery process, we reach a stable and consistent database 
(i.e. a database that does not contain any affected or malicious transaction). The database 
that we will reach is represented below: 
T1 = Employee („1‟, „Kim‟, „Stewart‟, „1980-11-02‟,‟Sales‟, „$2000‟); 
T4 = Categories („2‟, „Dairy Products);  
T5 = Products („2‟, „Cheese, „$4‟, „2‟); 
T6 = Employee („2‟, „John‟, „Adam‟, „1987-21-03‟, „Sales‟, „$1500‟); 
T7 = Customer („1‟, „X‟, „Beirut‟); 
T8 = Customer („2‟, „Y‟, „Beirut‟); 
T11 = Order („3‟, „1‟, „2‟, „2‟, „50‟, „$200‟, „2012-12-04‟); 
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Our proposed model uses a sequential log file and sequential dependency matrix. 
Both of which will contain only committed transactions and will be flushed at certain 
checkpoints. The matrix is the basis for the detection algorithm. It will help in assessing 
the transactions and categorizing them into affected and clean transactions. Then the 
result will be sent to the recovery algorithm to recover each malicious and affected 
transaction accordingly. We chose to use matrices in our algorithm due to the fact that 
matrices reduce the access time that is required to read the log file. In addition, the 
matrices enable us of skipping unwanted transactions without taking time to read them 
due to the indexing characteristic. On the other hand, when using a log file we should 
traverse all the transactions that occurred in order to reach the start point. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Overview  
We tested the performance of our model by means of a simulated environment. 
Our model requires the presence of a log file along with a dependency matrix to be able 
to perform each of the detection and recovery processes. Since our algorithm requires 
the presence of these two prerequisites, the simulated environment will be responsible of 
generating them before starting the execution of the model. In normal cases, when not 
working in a simulated environment, the log file and dependency matrix are supposed to 
be built as the transactions are being executed. Transactions in our database are 
generated randomly. The average transaction time is 2. The average transaction time 
reflects the number of products that the customer will buy in our database (i.e. how 
many transaction will be associated with a single order). 
All assumptions are taken into consideration in our proposed simulated 
environment. The history is assumed to be serializable. Only committed transactions will 
be added into the log file, such that every added transaction will have a unique and 
sequential ID, i.e. there will be no i < j such that Tj < Ti. This will ensure for us that 
there will never be a transaction that depends on a transaction that happened after it; this 
is an assumption that was taken as we built our model.  
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Moreover, the dependency matrix will also be created using the simulated 
program. Both the matrix and the log file have similar characteristics, such as only 
committed transactions will be added to the dependency matrix and they will take 
sequential IDs, such that there will be no  i < j and Tj < Ti. This work is usually 
performed directly after the commitment of any transaction, hence building the matrix 
up with every transaction commitment. 
As soon as an external intrusion detection system detects a malicious transaction, 
the ID will be sent to our model and the detection and recovery processes will start. For 
testing our model and for the sake of our simulated environment, we have done testing 
on more than one ID. The testing is done at different stages to see how would the 
behavior of our model change as it will have to traverse more rows in the matrix or even 
when it have to recover a larger amount transactions. 
We used the “Northwind Database” in our testing. This database is provided as a 
template in the Microsoft Access office. The data was then converted to .sql format and 
added to MySQL. The server that was used in our stimulation is WampServer 2.0 with 
the following configuration: Apache Version 2.2.11, PHP Version 5.3.0 and MySQL 
Version 5.1.36. The simulated environment was developed on a system with an Intel® 
Core™ 2 Duo CPU P8600 at 2.40 GHz and running under approximately 2.39 GHz, 
with a 2 GB RAM.  
4.2 Performance Analysis of Damage Assessment 
Our model is split into two different parts, damage assessment and recovery, each 
of which has its own characteristics and importance. These two parts are the building 
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blocks of our model, and hence the performance of each part is important. Hence, we 
will start by evaluating the performance of the first part of this model which is the 
detection process. 
Figure 4.1 represents the performance of our detection algorithm. The database 
that we have used to test our model contains 1080 transactions (rows) and 5000 data 
items (columns), with at most 45 columns being access by a transaction. As we can 
analyze from the graph that the sooner the attack is detected, the faster the detection 
process will be. This is due to the fact that our algorithm starts from the malicious row 
and goes on without looking at any transaction that happened before since as we have 
mentioned previously our matrix is sequential. If a transaction Tj was detected as a 
malicious transaction, then we know that we will never find Ti such that i < j and Ti 
depends on Tj. Hence, now we can point out the advantage of the matrices usage, which 
is the indexing characteristic that enables us to skip all the transactions that occurred 
before the malicious transaction and without taking the time to read and skip the clean 
transactions. 
As we can see from figure 4.1, the time needed for damage assessment decrease as 
the attacker ID increase. The attacker ID represents the transaction ID that has been 
affected. When the attacker ID is 100, the damage assessment algorithm has to traverse 
981 rows to find every affected transaction. Unlike when the attacker ID is 1000 where 
the damage assessment algorithm have to traverse and check only 81 rows. The time 
decrease from around 18.13µ second to 5.8µ seconds. As the algorithm has to traverse 
less number of rows, the time and effort needed for damage assessment will also 
decrease. This shows that the sooner the attack is detected the better and the faster the 
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damage assessment will be. This shows that our algorithm is capable of decreasing the 
time needed for damage assessment and hence less denial of service. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Performance of the Detection Algorithm based on different attacker ID 
Figure 4.2 portrays a time comparison between our algorithm (matrices) and three 
other algorithms (traditional, traditional clustered and hybrid cluster algorithms (Haraty 
& Zeitunlian, 2007)). The four algorithms were tested in the same environment, where 
we have database of 200 transactions with 5000 data items, in which only 45 data items 
are accessed as a maximum in a transaction. Therefore, the graph in figure 4.2 shows 
that our model is faster than the hybrid cluster by at least 167224 times (Kim et al., 
2010). This decrease in the damage assessment algorithm is due to the characteristics of 
our algorithm. The fact that we are using matrices makes our algorithm works faster, 
especially that matrices are easily indexed. When working with matrices we can easily 
skip any row and start from the point we want. The fact that our algorithm uses a 
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sequential matrix and that it starts from the point of the attack skipping anything before 
it makes it work faster. Unlike other algorithm, we only use one matrix that does not 
require any logical operations in the damage assessment phase. Moreover, our algorithm 
does not need to read the entire log file to cluster transactions according to dependency. 
The effort needed by other algorithms to read the log file is not needed in our algorithm. 
Hence, these characteristics improve our algorithm over previous algorithms. The matrix 
we are using contains all of the necessary information that is needed to assess the 
dependent transactions. Moreover, we are working with bits when numbers are not 
necessary which also reduces the effort. 
 
Figure 4.2 Damage assessment time comparison 
4.3 Performance Analysis for Recovery Algorithm 
After the detection phase and after we have saved all of the malicious and affected 
transactions, we can move to the second phase, the recovery. In this phase, we recover 
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every transaction that has been affected by malicious transactions and delete every 
malicious transaction. Figure 4.3 shows the time taken by our algorithm to recover the 
set of malicious and affected transactions. As we can see when the number of 
transactions that needs recovery increases, the time required for this recovery increase as 
well. Figure 4.3 shows the result for a database that constitute of 200 transactions, 5000 
columns. A transaction may access at most 45 columns. 
 
Figure 4.3 Performance of Recovery algorithm based on different number of affected 
transactions 
Figure 4.4 shows the time taken by the recovery algorithm as the number of 
recovered transactions increases. The database that gave the following results is 
composed of 1081 rows and 5000 columns. The maximum number of columns that can 
be accessed by a transaction is 45. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 present the same outcome (i.e. as 
the number of recovered transactions increases the time taken to recover will increase). 
The time graphed below is the time needed to recover from both malicious and affected 
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transactions. Figure 4.4 presents the advantage of our algorithm. Even when we worked 
on a larger scale database our algorithm was still faster than other algorithms. While 
other algorithms needed milliseconds to recover, our algorithm needed only less than 1 µ 
second. 
 
Figure 4.4 Performance of recovery on a larger scale database 
Figure 4.5 shows a comparison between our model and 4 other models (traditional, 
traditional clustered, hybrid clustered with data dependency, and the hybrid cluster with 
fixed size (Haraty and Zeitunlian, 2007)). The results show that in all the cases our 
model is much faster than any other model. In addition, in the worst case our model was 
faster in about 114,000,000 times than the other models. The reason of this improvement 
between our algorithm and other algorithms is the use of matrices. Moreover, the log file 
during recovery in our algorithm is converted to look like an array which makes the 
indexing easier and faster. Rather than reading the entire log file whenever we want to 
find a transaction we want to recover we just index its position in the array. The time 
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that was taken by other algorithms to read the log file is not needed in our algorithm; this 
will decrease in the timing. Our algorithm requires the effort to convert the log file to an 
array and this is done only once at the beginning of the recovery algorithm. 
 
Figure 4.5 Performance of the recovery algorithm in different models 
Figure 4.6 portrays the time taken by our model to build the matrix, detect and 
recover from an attack. To obtain the results below we used a database composed of 
5000 columns and 1081 transactions. It can be inferred from the figure below that the 
total time taken by our algorithm to detect and recovery from a malicious attack is less 
than the time taken to recover or detect using other models. In worst case scenarios we 
might have to see such numbers. In our model, the worst case scenario is when the 
malicious transaction is recovered after we have reached a check point. In such a case 
we would need to rebuild the matrix and then start our assessment. Since figure 4.5 
shows the time needed to build the matrix, detect and recover from malicious 
transactions, it also presents the worst case scenarios. This proves that even in the worst 
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case our algorithm is faster than when the other algorithms are recovering from normal 
cases. 
 
Figure 4.6 Time taken for different attacker IDs to go through our recovery model 
In conclusion, our model showed better performance in both detection and 
recovery processes. The time required by our algorithm to do the full process is much 
faster than the time required by a single process of other algorithms. Even if we shut 
down the system at certain times to recover, the time will not have a great negative 
effect on us. Using matrices saved time and reduced the possibility of having a denial of 
service or at least a long denial of service. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The security of a system is composed of three phases: prevention, detection and 
recovery. Prevention methods do not always work; hackers and attackers always find 
ways to breach the system. When prevention fails detection systems are supposed to 
detect the malicious transaction and report it to be stopped as soon as possible. Again 
detection systems fail to detect the malicious transaction as soon as they happen. For this 
reason malicious transactions affect other clean data. Hence, recovery methods are 
supposed to be effective, efficient and fast so that they recover from the malicious 
transaction and its effects. This model presented a new approach for recovery which 
depends on matrices. The dependency between transactions is all saved in a matrix that 
will be formed as the transactions are being committed. We tested our model and 
compared it with different previous approaches and the results showed that our model is 
faster by at least 100,000 times. The given results confirm that our approach is faster and 
more efficient than previously proposed models (traditional, traditional clustering, 
hybrid clustering according to data dependency and according to fixed size). Our model 
has proved to have an advantage on both levels: detection of affected transactions and 
recovery. 
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As a future work, we will work on the space issue. Our algorithm requires the 
presence of a matrix along with another structure to save the transactions it depend on, 
this requires space that could be diminished. 
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Appendix I  
Detection algorithm 
function Detect($M,$i, $j, $Malicious, $k,$secondArray) { 
$startTime=microtime (true); 
$firstAffected=min($Malicious); 
$startID=$firstAffected+1; 
$Affcol=0; 
for($row=$startID; $row<$j; $row++) { 
$flag=0; 
for ($column=1; $column<$i; $column++) { 
for($Mcol=0; $Mcol<$k;$Mcol++) { 
if($M[$row][$column]==$Malicious[$Mcol]) { 
$Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0]; 
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
}  
if(abs($M[$row][$column])==$Malicious[$Mcol]) { 
$Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0]; 
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
} 
if($M[$row][$column]<0) { 
$transID=abs($M[$row][$column]); 
if(array_key_exists($transID,$secondArray)) { 
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$countArray=count($secondArray[$transID]); 
for($traverse=0;$traverse<$countArray;$traverse++) { 
if($secondArray[$transID][$traverse]==$M[$row][0]) { 
$Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0]; 
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
} 
} 
} 
} 
  //if not found in the malicous array then it should be in the affected part 
if($flag==0) { 
for( $m=0; $m< $Affcol;$m++) { 
 if($M[$row][$column]==$Taffected[$m]) { 
 $Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0]; 
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
} 
 if(abs($M[$row][$column])==$Taffected[$m]) { 
$Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0];     
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
} 
if($M[$row][$column]<0) { 
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$transID=abs($M[$row][$column]); 
if(array_key_exists($transID,$secondArray))   { 
$countArray=count($secondArray[$transID]); 
for($traverse=0;$traverse<$countArray;$traverse++)  { 
if($secondArray[$transID][$traverse]==$Taffected[$m])  { 
$Taffected[$Affcol]=$M[$row][0];     
$Affcol++; 
$flag=1; 
break; 
} 
} 
}  
} 
 } 
} 
}//end Malicious array 
}//end $columns loop 
}//end $rows loop 
$endTime=microtime (true); 
$detecttime=$endTime-$startTime; 
Recover($Taffected, $Malicious); 
}//end function 
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Appendix II  
Recovery algorithm 
function Recover( $affected, $Malicious) { 
 $startTime=microtime (true); 
 $lines = file ("transactionsLog.txt"); 
 For ($i=0;$i<count($affected);$i++)  { 
$words=split ("[ ]", $lines[($affected[$i]-1)]); 
  $info=$words [12]; 
  $sepInfo=split (",", $info); 
  if($sepInfo[0] && $sepInfo[1])  { 
   $sql="Delete from ".$sepInfo[0]." where ".$sepInfo[1]; 
  } 
 } 
 for ($j=0;$j<count($Malicious);$j++) { 
  $words=split ("[ ]", $lines[($Malicious[$j]-1)]); 
  $info=$words [12]; 
  $sepInfo=split (",", $info); 
  if($sepInfo[0] && $sepInfo[1]) { 
   $sql="Delete from ".$sepInfo[0]." where ".$sepInfo[1]; 
  } 
 } 
 $endTime=microtime (true); 
 $total=$endTime-$startTime; 
} 
